

# **A Novel Attack Detection in Wireless Sensor Networks by Using Sequential Probability Ratio Test**

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## **ABSTRACT**

**The main objective of this project is to give security against attacks in the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). One of the most vexing problems in wireless sensor network security is the node Clone attack. In this attack, an adversary breaks into a sensor node, reprograms it, and inserts several copies of the node back into the sensor network. Cloning gives the adversary an easy way to build an army of malicious nodes that can cripple the sensor network. A few distributed solutions to address this fundamental problem have been recently proposed. However, these solutions are not satisfactory. Therefore first, the desirable properties of a distributed mechanism for the detection of node Clone attacks have been analyzed. Second, the known solutions for this problem do not completely meet our requirements. In this work, we propose a fast and effective mobile replication node detection scheme using Sequential probability Ratio Test..**

**Keywords: Sequential Analysis, Replica detection, Wireless sensor network**

## **I.INTRODUCTION**

Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) can be deployed in harsh environments to fulfill both military and civil applications. Due to their operating nature, they are often unattended, hence prone to different kinds of novel attacks. For instance, an adversary could eaves drop all network communications; further, an adversary could capture nodes acquiring all the information stored therein

sensors are commonly assumed to be not tamper-proof. Therefore, an adversary may replicate captured sensors and deploy them in the network to launch a variety of malicious activities. This attack is referred to as the clone attack. Since a clone has legitimate information code and cryptographic material it may participate in the network operations in the same way as a non-compromised node; hence, cloned nodes can launch a variety of attacks. A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a collection of sensors with limited resources that collaborate to achieve a common goal. WSNs can be deployed in harsh environments to fulfil both military and civil applications. Due to their operating nature, they are often unattended, hence prone to different kinds of novel attacks. For instance, an adversary could eaves drop all network communications; further, an adversary could capture nodes acquiring all the information stored therein—sensors are commonly assumed to be not tamper-proof.

To carry out a variety of missions, the network operator deploys the base station and a set of small sensor devices in the network field. Specifically, sensor devices form ad-hoc networks, collaborate with each other to sense the phenomenon associated with the assigned missions and then sends the sensory data to the base station. The network operator obtains the mission related information by analyzing the data collected at the base station. To help sensor nodes carry out the missions efficiently and effectively, many researchers proposed a variety of the network service and communication protocols. Specifically, localization, coverage, compression and aggregation protocols have been proposed for the network services. Various network protocols from

Physical layer to transport layer have been proposed for the communication. However, most of them focus on making the protocols be attack-resilient rather than removing the source of attacks. Although attack-resiliency approach mitigates the threats on the network services and communication protocols, this approach requires substantial time and effort to continuously enhance the robustness of the protocols in accordance with the emergence of new types of attacks. Moreover, since it is hard to predict new types of attacks, the protocols will likely have resiliency only after being damaged by new types of attacks. Thus, we need to detect and revoke the sources of attacks as soon as possible to substantially reduce the costs and damages incurred by employing attack-resilience approach. The principle sources of various attacks are compromised sensor nodes in the sense that attacker can compromise sensor nodes by exploiting the unattended nature of wireless sensor networks and thus do any malicious activities with them.

To meet this need, we propose a node capture attack detection scheme in wireless sensor networks. We use the fact that the physically captured nodes are not present in the network during the period from the captured time to redeployed time. Accordingly, captured nodes would not participate in any network operations during that period. By leveraging this intuition, we detect captured nodes by using the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT). The main advantage of our scheme is to quickly detect captured nodes with the aid of the SPRT.

## **II. LITERATURE SURVEY**

Hubaux, 2006; Ganeriwal et al., 2005; Hu et al., 2008; Li et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2005; Song et al., 2007; KSun et al., 2006). A Randomized, Efficient, and Distributed (RED) protocol was proposed to enhance the line selected multicast

scheme of (Parno et al., 2005) in terms of replica detection

However, RED still has the same communication

overhead as the line-selected multicast scheme of (Parno et al., 2005). More significantly, their protocol requires repeated location claims over time, meaning that the cost of the scheme needs to be multiplied by the number of runs during the total deployment time. Localized multicast schemes based on the grid cell topology detect replicas by letting location claim be multicast to a single cell or multiple cells (Zhu et al., 2007). The main strength of (Zhu et al., 2007) is that it achieves higher detection rates than the best scheme of (Parno et al., 2005). However, (Zhu et al., 2007) has similar communication overheads as (Parno et al., 2005).

A clone detection scheme was proposed in sensor networks (Choi et al., 2007). In this scheme, the network is considered to be a set of non-overlapping sub regions. An exclusive subset is formed in each sub region. If the intersection of subsets is not empty, it implies that replicas are included in those subsets. Fingerprint-based replica node detection scheme was proposed in sensor networks (Xing et al., 2008). In this scheme, nodes report fingerprints, which identify a set of their neighbors, to the base station. The base station performs replica detection by using the property that fingerprints of replicas conflict each other.

## **III. PROBLEM DEFINITION**

### **3.1 Network Models**

Sensor networks are often deployed in an unattended manner, most of these protocols are exposed to a variety of attacks such as denial of service attacks, routing disruption and false data injection attacks, network service disruption attacks (Du & Xiao, 2008; Karlof & Wagner, 2003; Wood & Stankovic, 2002). To defend the wireless sensor networks against these various attacks, many schemes have been developed in the literature. For instance, secure routing schemes have been proposed to mitigate routing disruption attacks (Karlof & Wagner, 2003; Parno et al., 2006). False data injection attacks can be mitigated by

using the authentication schemes (Ye et al., 2004; Yu & Li, 2009; Zhu et al., 2004).

We first assume a static sensor network in which the locations of sensor nodes do not change after deployment. We also assume that every sensor node works in promiscuous mode and is able to identify the sources of all messages originating from its neighbors. We believe that this assumption does not incur substantial overhead because each node inspects only the source IDs of the messages from its neighbors rather than the entire contents of the messages.

### 3.2 Attacker Models

We assume that an attacker can physically capture sensor nodes to compromise them. However, we place limits on the number of sensor nodes that he can physically capture in each target region. This is reasonable from the perspective that an increase in the number of the captured sensor nodes will lead to a rise in the likelihood that attacker is detected by

intruder detection mechanisms. Therefore, a rationale attacker will want to physically capture the limited number of sensor nodes in each target region while not being detected by intruder detection mechanisms. Moreover, we assume that it takes a certain amount of time from capturing nodes to redeploying them in the network. This is reasonable in the sense that an attacker needs some time to compromise captured sensor nodes.

## IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM

### 4.1 Mobile Replica Detection Using SPRT

This section presents the details of techniques to detect replica attacks in mobile sensor networks.

In static sensor networks, a sensor node can be considered to be replicated if it is placed at more than one location. However, if nodes are allowed to freely roam throughout

the network, the above technique does not work because the mobile nodes location will continuously change as it moves. Hence, it is imperative to use some other technique to detect replica nodes in mobile sensor networks. Fortunately, mobility provides us with a clue that can help resolve the mobile replica detection problem. Specifically, a mobile sensor node should never move faster than the system-configured maximum speed. Accordingly, if it observes that the mobile nodes speed is over the maximum speed, it is then highly likely that at least two nodes with the same identity are present in the network.

To apply SPRT to the mobile replica detection problem as follows. Each time a mobile sensor node moves to a new location, each of its neighbors asks for a signed claim containing its location and time information and decides probabilistically whether to forward the received claim to the base station. The base station computes the speed from every two consecutive claims of a mobile node and performs the SPRT by taking speed as an observed sample




Fig .1 Detection of attacker node

Each time maximum speed is exceeded by the mobile node; it will expedite the random walk to hit or cross the upper limit and thus lead to the base station accepting the alternate hypothesis that the mobile node has been replicated. On the other hand, each time the maximum speed of the mobile node is not reached, it will expedite the random walk to hit or cross the lower limit and thus lead to the base station accepting the null hypothesis that mobile node has not been replicated. Once the base station decides that a mobile node has been replicated, it initiates

revocation on the replica nodes.

Additionally, the energy consumption for movement is known to be substantially larger than that for public key operations. For instance, the power consumption for the movement of a mobile sensor device was measured as 720 mW, whereas the energy consumption for public key signature is measured from 2.9 mW to 48 mW while that for public key verification was measured from 3.5 mW to 58.5 mW in accordance with the sensor hardware platforms. Thus, we believe that the public key scheme can be practical for mobile sensor networks.

We also assume that every mobile sensor node is able to obtain its location information and verify the locations of its neighboring nodes. This can be implemented by employing GPS. This assumption may not lead to additional costs if the location information is used for other purposes. Finally, we assume that the clocks of all nodes are loosely synchronized with a maximum error of. This can be achieved by the use of secure time.

In this Paper, analyze the desirable properties of distributed mechanisms for detection of node replication attack. And also analyze the first protocol for distributed detection, proposed and show that this protocol is not completely satisfactory with respect to the above properties. Second propose a new randomized, efficient, and distributed (RED) protocol for the detection of node replication attacks, and also prove that our protocol does meet all the above cited requirements.

## **V. MODULE DESCRIPTION**

### **5.1 Network Creation**

This module is developed in order to create a dynamic network. In a network, nodes are interconnected and the resources can be shared among them. For the successful data transfer the network must be properly controlled and handled. This module is designed in order to develop a controlled network traffic environment. Our project aim is to reduce the server load by splitting the

server work. For these we need some replica nodes.

### **5.2 Identification of Replication Node**

Node updates its location information to base station. At a time, both nodes send same location information to the base station of which one is true and other is false. Using the following notations it can identify the replicate node.  $V_{max}$  is the configured maximum system speed and  $N$  is the Number of nodes.

### **5.3 Attacker Models**

This section presents the details using SPRT (Sequential Probability Ratio Test), this technique to detect replica node attacks in mobile sensor networks. Speed denote a Bernoulli random variable defined as,  $S = \{ 0; \text{if } o_i \leq V_{max}; 1; \text{if } o_i > V_{max}; \}$  The problem of deciding whether it had been replicated or not can be formulated as a hypothesis testing problem with Null and Alternate hypotheses respectively. Null hypothesis mean  $V_{max}$  speed controlled by system configuration, Alternative hypothesis mean  $V_{max}$  speed Increased over the system configuration. If the base station receive alternative hypothesis that node was identified attack Node then the base station.

## **FUTURE WORK**

In the red protocol have randomized witness distribution. It may be possible for clone attack involved. Therefore we can enhance the red protocol we include the distributed hash table.

A distributed hash table is a decentralized distributed system that provides a key-based lookup service similar to a hash table key, record pairs are stored in the DHT, and any participating node can efficiently store and retrieve records associated with specific keys. By design, DHT distributes responsibility of maintaining the mapping from keys to records among nodes in an efficient and balanced way, which allows DHT to scale to extremely

large networks and suitable to serve as a facility of distributed node clone detection. In fact, DHT techniques have been utilized to provide data-central storage and indexing services for distributed sensor networks, such as object-tracking, and to design DHT-driven sensor network routing protocols

and false negative rates below 1%.

## **VII. CONCLUSION**

In this paper, we proposed a node capture attack detection scheme using the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT). We showed the limitations of the benefits that attacker can take from launching node capture attacks when our scheme is employed. We also analytically showed that our scheme detects node capture attacks with a few number of samples while sustaining the false positive

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